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Private Heath Matthews of "C" Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, awaits medical attention
beside the Regimental Aid Post on 22 June 1952 following a night patrol.
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 128850)
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''Miniature Set-Piece Battles''
Infantry Patrolling Operations in
Korea, May-June 1952
Christopher Doary
ith the exception of an area south of
Kaesong, the front line in Korea generally
lay north of the 38th parallel by April 1952.
Armistice negotiations had been ongoing since
the latter half of 1951 and had come to reflect
the static front that existed as the Korean War
entered its third year.

W

It was in this climate that a directive from
the Headquarters of 1st US Corps was issued to
the First Commonwealth Division ( 1 Comwel
Div) on 18 May 1952. It directed that the
division's forward battalions were to carry out
weekly fighting patrols with the aim of capturing
at least one prisoner every three days. 1 This was
to prove a frustrating task for the division's
British and Canadian brigades.

By the end of June 1952 it was clear that
this patrolling policy, and the operations that it
had spawned, had failed. A number of reasons
could be used to explain why Canadians, in
particular, were unable to realize the policy's
objective. For example, there may have been a
reluctance on the part of some to risk lives in a
"foreign" war, especially at a time when an
armistice appeared imminent. But there are
more compelling arguments for the policy's
demise. The reason for the general failure of the
Corps directive rests with the questionable merit
and unrealistic aims of the policy itself.
Notwithstanding this, the inability of Canadians
to overcome the directive's shortcomings can be
attributed to ineffective patrol planning and
preparation, and a lack of training, especially in
infantry patrolling.

within the operational situation as it existed in
May 1952. What follows is an examination of
the US directive, and thereafter, a detailed study
of the patrolling operations of the First Battalion,
The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR) in MayJune 1952. The RCRs have been selected as a
case study based upon their performance within
the Canadian brigade. They not only conducted
the most fighting and ambush patrols, but had
the most enemy contacts and carried out the
most successful raid during this period. 2
By the end of April 1952, 1 Comwel Div held
the "Jamestown" line to the northeast of the
Sami-ch'on several kilometres northwest of
where it flows into the Imjin-gang, and some 50
kilometres north of Seoul. As part of this
division, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade (25
CIB) was responsible for manning positions on
the east side of the Sami-ch'on and an unnamed
tributary that flows into it from the northeast.
The brigade's left flank was protected by the 1st
US Marine Division on the west bank, while the
British 28th Brigade, on the Canadian right,
marked the right-hand boundary of the
Commonwealth sector. 3
During this month, the Active Force
paratroopers of the first battalions of the RCR
and the Royal 22nd Regiment (1 R22eR), known
as the "Vandoos," replaced the Special Force
volunteers of their second battalions in 25 CIB.
Together with the First Battalion Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI), who
had rotated earlier in 1951, they set about
improving their defensive positions in the first
weeks of May 1952.

Before a discussion of these arguments can
be undertaken, it is necessary to locate them
©Canadian Military History, Volume 6, Number L Spring 1997, pp.20-33.
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The RCRs found themselves sandwiched
between the Western Canadian Patricias in the
north and the French Canadians to their south
(see Map 1 ). They were dug in along two parallel
ridges that ran east-west. The ridges' western
ends faced a narrow valley, a mixture of paddy
fields and old plough land, crossed by dried-up
ditches. The valley's lower slopes were covered
with scrub, while the upper slopes revealed stony
ground exposed by repeated artillery fire and air
strikes. 4 A track and a stream divided the valley
along its length. The westem side, manned by
the Chinese 119 Division, was described by a
member of'D' Company's 10 platoon:
The battered but still dangerous features, known
by their spot heights as Pt 166 and Pt 133,
glowered at us with their faces scarred by UN
explosives and Chinese digging. Forward of these
two hulks is the great amphitheatre of Pt 113
the ridge ofPt 72 and the lump ofPt 75. 5

The difficult terrain and the Chinese positions,
interlaced with numerous trenches, bunkers,
and tunnels, the latter dug through rock and
almost impervious to bombardment, presented
the RCRs with many challenges. 6
With the Canadian situation established, the
motives and aims of those who administered the
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patrolling policy can now be discussed. A general
overview of the policy's implementation is useful
in highlighting these.
On 17 May the Brigade Major of 25 CIB,
Major J.C. Allan, drafted an instruction which
stated: "With effect 18 May 52 battalions will
carry out at least one strong fighting patrol each
per week, with the aim of establishing contact
with the enemy. "7 No mention of prisoners was
made in this instruction. Two weeks later,
another instruction was issued to the Canadian
battalions by Allan on 3 June clarifying that the
purpose of fighting patrols during the latter half
of May had been to "establish contact with the
enemy and obtain maximum reaction" and he
concluded that this had been accomplished. 8 He
went on to say that, effective immediately and
until further notice, fighting patrols could be
discontinued while ambush, reconnaissance and
standing patrols would be kept up. However, on
11 June, a conference held at 1 Comwel Div
noted, under the heading "Raids to capture PW,"
that prisoners were required and that all
divisions were instructed to carry out raids up
to company strength. 9 The war diarist of the
Canadian brigade confirms this and wrote on
the same day that the brigade had again been
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requested to take "aggressive action" in its
patrolling policy in order to capture a prisoner
every six days. 10 Even as late as 21 June, the
Canadian brigade's war diarist commented that
orders had come from the division commander
emphasizing the need to capture prisoners. 11 It
seems clear that the stated aim of the patrolling
policy through May and June, continued to be
the capture of prisoners. However, the
Commonwealth Division Commander, MajorGeneral Cassels, writing in the division's periodic
report, challenged the wisdom of insisting on
such a restrictive policy:
.. .I am being harassed and ordered by Corps to
produce a prisoner every third day, apparently
regardless of cost. As we know quite well what
enemy divisions are in front of us I cannot see
the point in this and have said so and have asked
if there is any special reason behind the request
[for prisoners] ... Personally I believe the reason
behind the order was to keep the U.S. Army
divisions "sharp" regardless of casualties, and
at least one of their divisions had taken very
considerable casualties -between 2,000 and
3,000. The Commander of lst U.S. Marine
Division .. .is in complete agreement with my
views. 12

The Canadian Brigade Commander, Brigadier
Bogert, echoed this sentiment by attempting to
scale down the patrolling operations on 3 June
after May's patrols had suffered 52 casualties,
of which nine were fatal, but failed to bring back
a single prisoner. 13
If Cassels was right about the American
motive behind the patrolling policy, did the
capturing of prisoners have any merit on its own?
The most surprising answer originates with 1
US Corps Periodic Intelligence Report dated 20
June 1952. The author of the report had
conducted a comparison of Prisoner of War (PW)
reports for April 1951 and 1952. He found that
while the prisoners captured in 1951 were wellinformed concerning their own and adjacent unit
positions, recent PW's possessed no information
of value. 14 Considering that a good number of
"agents" and deserters were proving to be a good
source of intelligence, it seems remarkable that
Corps HQ would continue to give the capture of
PWs such a high priority. 15
This suggests that the policy was designed
from the start not as an intelligence-gathering
vehicle, but rather as a way to keep front-line
units in fighting trim. But, despite the

Lieutenant Paul Ranger checks Private Jean-Guy
Lacroix's wireless set as he prepares for a night

patrol. Note the soft shoes, dark clothing and black
face make-up. 14 June 1952.
(Photo by George Whittaker, NAC PA 136788

disillusionment felt by those commanders
responsible for its execution, Canadian soldiers
were to mount no less than 1,033 patrols of all
types during this period. 16
The majority of these were static standing
patrols, that is, routine three- to five-man patrols
better described as early warning listening posts
or perimeter security, the latter to monitor gaps
in wire and minefields to facilitate the mounting
of other patrols. Major W.H. Pope, who served
with 1 R22eR as a company commander, drafted
a paper entitled "Infantry Patrolling in Korea" in
1953. In it he disputed the value of these
outposts because they were static, known to the
enemy and therefore ineffective as early
warning. 17
Another type, the ambush patrol, was
criticized by Pope for being sent out whether or
not any signs of the enemy had been reported
and therefore went out as per a schedule "to
places where it would be most convenient for us
for the enemy to pass. "18 This is borne out by
23
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the fact that of 25 ambushes mounted by the
RCRs in June only five were laid beyond the river
on the enemy side of the valley. 19 Altogether, 43
of these patrols were mounted by the Canadians
in May and June and none succeeded in
ambushing the enemy. Of note, however, was an
ambush patrol, led by Corporal Presley of "D"
Company, 1 RCR, which interrupted an enemy
ambush patrol of platoon strength as it deployed
some 300 metres south of "D" Company's
defensive position.
Presley's patrol had been returning to its
lines when one of its members spotted an enemy
soldier and opened fire on him. Because the
Chinese were in the process of laying their
ambush, the RCRs managed to extricate
themselves and re-enter their lines but not before
Presley had been mortally wounded. It was later
determined that the Chinese had planned their
ambush well with the main part of their force in
extended line across the reentrant south of"D"
Company and a fire base on Point 101 some 300
metres to the southeast. Intelligence garnered
from the body of an enemy soldier killed by
Presley's patrol identified the soldier as being
part of a security unit, suggesting that the
Chinese had employed specialist troops in what
was likely an attempt to capture a PW. 20
Some eight or nine "Jitter" patrols, an RCR
creation, were also carried out. This unorthodox
patrol of roughly 12 men attempted to bait the
enemy into reacting to its fire which purportedly
simulated a Canadian attack. Jitter patrols were
designed to move up to the enemy position and
open fire before withdrawing several hundred
metres to lay an ambush. The aim was to tempt
the enemy into either revealing his position so
that artillery fire could be brought to bear, or to
entice him to advance into a hasty ambush. In
the first case, the effects of bombardment were
likely negligible and difficult to verify given the
nature of the Chinese positions. In the second
instance, the problem lay in persuading the
Chinese that an attack was underway and that
the Canadians could be successfully
counterattacked. However, jitter patrols rarely
went beyond the river21 and therefore must have
appeared as rather unconvincing threats. At the
same time, this type of patrol put itself at risk
by inviting Chinese return fire on the patrol's
relatively unprotected position on the valley floor.
Brigadier Bogert nevertheless encouraged the use

of jitter patrols by other Canadian battalions. 22
Jitter patrols never succeeded in ambushing the
Chinese. Instead, an RCR jitter patrol, led by
Lieutenant Goldie on the night of 28 May,
suffered one killed and two wounded when it
was surprised (or ambushed?) by an enemy
patrol. 23
The reconnaissance patrol, arguably the best
intelligence gathering patrol of all, was not well
represented during this period. Designed to
observe the enemy (ideally without making
contact), it generally comprised less than three
soldiers. One might assume therefore that the
RCR patrolling operations would have gained
much from their employment. Although it is
possible that other patrols may have had
reconnaissance tasks, only three reconnaissance
patrols were recorded by the RCRs in May and
June, and none were part of a preparation for
impending offensive action. 24 The author of
Strange Battleground, Herbert Wood, points out
that "this must have made the planning of fighting
or ... ambush patrols very difficult. 25
Despite the lack of reconnaissance, the
Canadian brigade conducted 20 fighting patrols
in the month of May alone. These fighting patrols,
or raids as they were often called, appear to have
been the best candidate for the capture of
prisoners. Most were parties of 20-30 men. A
detailed study of two RCR fighting patrols, a
platoon-sized one in May and a company raid in
June, will serve to highlight the shortcomings of
these patrols and explain why they were unable
to bring back a PW.
Six fighting patrols, dispatched by 1 RCR in
the first three weeks of May, had failed to capture
prisoners while suffering a total of seven
wounded and one missing. 26 The quick and
effective Chinese reaction to the presence of
patrols near their positions prevented the
Canadians from getting in close enough to grab
a captive. However, Brigadier Bogert had learned
that the Chinese retired deep into their bunker
systems during UN air strikes, and reasoned that
"a timely air strike at dusk followed by additional
supporting fire would enable a patrol to reach
its objective before the Chinese could offer a
response. "27 With this in mind he ordered
Colonel Bingham, commanding officer of 1 RCR,
to conduct a raid on Pt. 113 (see Map 2).
Lieutenant Peterson and 22 others of "A"
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Map 2- Chinch'on, 31 May 1952
Company were assigned the task. While
Peterson's group rehearsed its mission, an
extensive fire plan was drawn up. Along with
fighter-bombers and their 1,000-pound bombs,
the plan included artillery, mortar, machine gun
and even light antiaircraft gun fire. 28 Given that
the airstrike had to take place during daylight if
it was to be on target, and that the RCR patrol
could not leave its lines without the cover of
darkness, the patrol would have to make its way
to the objective as quickly as possible after the
bombing run was completed. With the details
worked out, the date was set for the end of the
month.
Overcast skies and a quarter moon made the
last evening of May ideal. Thirteen minutes after
the completion of the airstrtke, the patrol left its
lines and had crossed the river by 2030 hours.
Near the village of Chinch'on, the patrol
commander called down the artillery as planned
and moved his patrol up to the first line of
communication trenches which were found
abandoned and in disrepair. Leaving behind a
"firm base," the remainder of the patrol moved
up the draw on the north slope of Hill 113 while
indirect and direct fire support continued on a
timed program. The patrol found the second line

of trenches to be similarly deserted, but the
second-in-command, Corporal Stinson, and six
men were left to search the bunkers while
Peterson and seven others proceeded to the
trenches atop the hill. 29
As Stinson's group cleared bunkers with
shouts of"Chu-la" ("come out" in Chinese) and
phosphorous grenades, a soldier appeared and
was taken prisoner. However, when an enemy
section counterattacked from Hill 115 three
Canadians were wounded, including the man
guarding the prisoner. The Chinese soldier tried
to escape but was shot by the injured guard and
the dead man's body was searched before
Stinson's men began to fight their way back to
the firm base. 30
Meanwhile, the patrol leader's group had
been clearing trenches and bunkers as they
moved west along the crest. Although Peterson
had spotted an enemy soldier moving below him
in a tunnel, his men were unable to take a
prisoner before the firefight between Stinson's
men and the counterattacking Chinese prompted
him to withdraw to the firm base. After
reorganizing his patrol near the village, Peterson
25
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moved his troops back to the river under steady
fire from the Chinese. By 2316 hours the patrol
had returned to its own lines carrying the two
more seriously wounded of their four
casualties. 31
Later, Lieutenant Peterson would receive the
Military Cross, and Corporal Stinson, the
Military Medal for their actions in what MajorGeneral Cassels called "a specially daring raid
against a strong enemy position. "32 Touted as a
success by the diarist ofthe Canadian brigade, 33
an evaluation reiterated by the author of"A Patrol
in Korea, "34 the patrol's outcome nevertheless
raised many questions. For example, to the
patrol's astonishment, they could find no enemy
dead to testifY to the effectiveness of an enormous
amount of friendly supporting fire. Instead, the
patrol commander noted that the enemy had
recovered rapidly from the intense air and
artillery bombardment and appeared from
bunkers and foxholes in all directions. Stinson's
group was also struck by the determination of
the enemy counterattack which took place under
UN machine gun, mortar and artillery fire and
eventually came close enough to engage his group
with grenades. In addition, the use of fighter
bombers, which temporarily neutralized the
enemy hill, forced the patrol to move faster than
a patrol would normally do. The patrol covered
some 900 metres to the river in nine minutes
and thereby exposed itself to enemy ambush.
Therefore, the preponderance of supporting fire
allotted the patrol failed to prevent a rapid enemy
reaction against it and denied its commander
sufficient flexibility as a result of the elaborately
timed fire plan.
As for the effects taken from the short-lived
captive during one of the most successful fighting
patrols, they contained little of military value
except to prove that a Chinese private was better
equipped than presupposed. 35 Ultimately, as
Woods reminds his readers, the patrol had failed
in its objective- to capture a prisoner.
Thereafter aggressive patrolling along the
Canadian front declined in intensity until, in the
later half of June, pressure from divisional
headquarters prompted a series of larger raids
conducted by each of the Canadian battalions.
On the night of 22 June the RCR effort, a

company-sized patrol, was carried out by "C"
Company on Hill 113 (see Map 3).
Codenamed "Beaverdam" and led by the
officer commanding "C" Company, Major
Holmes, the operation's intent was to take and
hold Hill 113 for not less than an hour to
facilitate a thorough search of the position and
the capture ofPWs. Intelligence estimates placed
an enemy section and medium machine gun on
Point 115, a platoon on 113, a section on the
ridge around Point 72 with another two sections
on Hill 75. The company was organized into
three elements: an assault platoon, a mop-up
platoon and company headquarters (Coy HQ),
and a reserve platoon. Once again the patrol was
planned in detail, incorporating an elaborate fire
plan of artillery, mortar, tank and machine-gun
fire, a reconnaissance from forward observation
posts and rehearsals in rear areas. 36
At 2327 hours the assault platoon left by
way of the "A" Company south "gate" followed by
the remainder of the patrol with the reserve
platoon departing an hour later. The patrol
travelled south and then northwest to the river
in three groups. At about 0200 hours and
approximately 150 metres east of the abandoned
village of Chinch'on the assault platoon took fire
in the form of four or five rifle shots. This platoon
continued to advance, cutting across the track
at the northeast end of the settlement and
proceeding up the draw between Points 113 and
115. Meanwhile the fire plan had been initiated
by Major Holmes at 0205 hours and with this
covering fire the second group moved up to the
base of Hill 113. About the time the first group
reached the middle line of Chinese crawl
trenches, three large explosions (later thought
to be an ad hoc antipersonnel device detonated
manually by the enemy) occurred at brief regular
intervals amongst Coy HQ and the mop-up
platoon, wounding three men. Shortly afterward
four men of the assault platoon, having reached
the crest around 0220 hours, entered enemy
bunkers. The situation became critical almost
immediately as the platoon was exposed to
grenades, automatic weapon and light machine
gun fire which resulted in the three section
commanders and the platoon signaller becoming
casualties, in addition to two of those already
on the Chinese position. With five wounded and
one killed the platoon withdrew to the second
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Map 3- Chinch'on, 22 June 1952

RCR battle casualties for June were five
killed and 39 wounded. Operation "Beaverdam"
cost 29 casualties, including one fatality, in the
span of three hours. 38 To put this in perspective,
a Patricia patrol the night before had fared even
worse, suffering six killed and 18 wounded in a
raid on Hill 133 near Pukch'ang. The Vandoos
met with similar resistance on the night of 23
June and lost one killed, five wounded and two
missing in another fighting patrol. In no cases
were prisoners taken. 39

been alerted. The disruption of command and
control by explosions amidst the mop-up platoon
and Coy HQ left the assault platoon temporarily
on its own and made it difficult to co-ordinate
support from the reserve platoon, which in any
case was too far back to provide immediate
assistance to those on top of the feature. Similar
explosions had contributed to the toll of 24
casualties suffered by the Patricia's 35 man
patrol the night before, but had yet to be
investigated when "C" Company set off for its
raid on Hill 113. Finally as Major Holmes
explained in an interview: "The wounding of three
key men ... at the crucial point of success, where
so much depends on the junior leader, is
considered the prime factor which cheated the
company of victory. "40 This aside, "C" Company
had relied, like Peterson's patrol at the end of
May, upon overwhelming fire support rather than
stealth and surprise. This had once again proven
ineffective, and inappropriate given the
operational situation.

With respect to the RCR patrol, its problems
began early with its compromise near the river;
by the time the patrol was within striking
distance of the Chinese positions, the enemy had

Given what has been shown of RCR
patrolling operations, it is important to consider
Major Pope's allegation that there was a "sit-tight
mentality" pervasive among UN commanders in

line of trenches where it reorganized before
moving down to the base ofthe hill. About 0300
hours the company began to move back under
automatic small arms and accurate mortar fire.
Despite the smoke that filled the valley the patrol
continued to suffer casualties as it returned by
way of the north gate of "A" Company's position
as Chinese mortar fire shifted onto the RCR
defensive positions and inflicted still more
casualties before dawn. 37

27
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OPERATION "BEAVERDAM"- Before
Top left: The OC of "C" Company, Major
Don Holmes (seated, centre), reviews air
photos with his officers and senior NCOs
before setting out on the night's fighting
patrol. Major Holmes had enlisted in the
ranks in 1940 and was commissioned
two years later. 1 n 1944 he served as a
CANLOAN officer with 6th British
Airborne Division. Left to right are 2nd
Lt. G. Ritchie, Sgt. J. Mazerolle, W02 J.
Doran, Sgt. G. Macpherson, Lt. E. Bauld,
Maj. Holmes, Sgt. Desroches and Sgt.
B. Robinson.
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 129739)

Top right: Sergeant Don Desroches of 8

Korea which contributed to a "defeatist" spirit among their
soldiers or that "many Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels with
WW II experience were most concerned not to get
themselves killed in a side show like Korea. "41 The evidence
in the Canadian example does not support his first
contention while the second is conjecture and difficult to
prove either way. Although many commanders were
reluctant to risk their subordinates' lives for unclear aims,
they nevertheless attempted, perhaps at times
overcautiously, to prosecute the war by taking the fight to
the enemy, as more than 20 raids by the Canadian brigade
in May and June attest. The failure of the raids had less to
do with hesitation on the part of commanders than with
other factors.

Platoon, "C" Company, combines his
study of an air photo with his meal
during preparation for Operation
"Beaverdam." He carries Thompson
submachine gun ammunition in his
bandolier.
(Photo by G. Whittaker, NAC PA 151744)
Bottom left: Major Holmes checks
Private H.J. Norris' equipment. Because
radio communications often failed,
Operation "Beaverdam" planned to use
field telephones to maintain contact with
HQ and the battalion's fire control
centre. Note the spools of wire carried
by Privates Norris and Drinkwater.
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 129740)
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OPERATION "BEAVERDAM" - After
Top left: Private H.A. Schreyer, one of
the more seriously wounded during the
"C" Company raid, is evacuated to a
field hospital in an American helicopter.
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 131723)

Top right: Privates Thomas Ridgeway,
John Gandy and Jim Graham (left to
right) fired some 8,000 rounds of
ammunition over a two-hour period
while providing fire support with their
Vickers machine gun during Operation
"Beaverdam." Note the empty cartridge
cases under the gun and the used belts
behind Private Graham.
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 131762)

Bottom left: Lieutenent E.G. Bauld

(with jump smock and sidearm) stands
outside the Regimental Aid Post on the
morning of 22 June with some of his
men. He was slightly wounded leading
the assault platoon which suffered the
operation's only fatality. Private A.J.
Gosselin.
(NAC PA 192639)

A sounder argument would be that UN
commanders failed to appreciate the operational
and tactical situations in deciding upon the
patrolling policy and its emphasis on the capture
of prisoners. While this certainly appears to be
true, Canadian brigade and battalion
commanders were likewise negligent in their

appreciation of the situation. And, for this
reason, a substantial part of the blame for the
policy's failure rests with those who were
responsible for the policy's execution.
This is borne out, in part, by the tendency of
Canadian commanders to manage patrols as setpiece miniature battles, as was the case with the
two RCR patrols studied. It was this mind set,
rather than the sit-tight mentality espoused by
Pope, that commanders were guilty of
harbouring. They de-emphasised the importance
of stealth and surprise - key elements in the
success of Canadian trench raids in the First
World War, 42 in favour of a methodical approach
29
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which relied on a preponderance of firepower to
fight their patrols onto enemy positions. They
also underestimated the enemy, both in his
ability to weather fierce bombardment and to
strike back at Canadian patrols. Patrolling, as
will be seen, was not a phase of war in its own
right, but merely an extension of offensive or
defensive operations. Commanders, still in the
process of coming to terms with the
fundamentals of patrolling operations, were
handicapped by a certain amount of
complacency with the tried and true tactics of
an offensive and defensive doctrine developed
over two world wars. This naturally meant that
planning, preparation, and training were shaped
by patterns that did not necessarily fit the
requirements of patrolling.
In 1943 the Canadian army had faced a
similar challenge during the Italian winter as an
RCR officer relates:
The war bogged down and became a replica of
the early months of World War I...[and] life for
the infantry was one long round of
reconnaissance or fighting patrols. The RCR
provided 64 of these patrols ...The Germans were
good watchers. They rarely patrolled forward of
their own lines, other than to establish ambush
patrols on our likely routes into their territory.
Night after night Canadian patrols walked into a
line of fire, or got caught in a mortar
concentration. They never seemed to accomplish
anything ... 43

The frustration felt by Strome Galloway was
undoubtedly shared by those of his regiment who
later served in Korea, as there is little in 1952 to
suggest that the RCRs had profited much by their
patrolling experience in World War Two. What
appears more likely is that no-man's-land was
dominated by the Chinese, as Pope alleged, and
not by the Canadians, as Bogert claimed. 44
Galloway's disenchantment with patrolling
was likely the result of what Pope warned would
occur if patrols did not have a clearly defined
purpose. Morale, he said, suffered when
patrolling became routine, often having nothing
to report (NTR). Many of the patrols conducted
by 1 RCR in the spring of 1952 were NTRs, and
almost every contact with the enemy resulted in
Canadian casualties. 45 Therefore, the 1 RCR
patrolling plan itself was flawed because it lacked
a motive force as the unlikelihood of capturing
prisoners became evident, and because for the

majority of patrols the taking of prisoners was
never a serious consideration.
However, there is little doubt that the
prisoner issue dominated to the detriment of the
patrolling agenda. A report prepared by the
British 28th Infantry Brigade in April 1953
stresses the importance of thorough
reconnaissance in the planning of patrols,
although it neglects to stress the use of
reconnaissance patrols in this capacity. It is
careful to point out instead that "the need for
prisoners is so great that the primary task of
reconnaissance may be sacrificed if the
opportunity to take a prisoner presents itself. "46
This preoccupation with prisoners is only part
of a wider problem, the relegation of
reconnaissance to that of secondary importance
in the preparation of patrols.
The few reconnaissance patrols listed on the
Canadian brigade's patrol task table, 47 suggest
that reconnaissance beyond forward defended
localities was not required for the preparation
of patrols. It may also have been thought that
the lightly-manned reconnaissance patrol was
too vulnerable on the battlefield, commanders
opting instead to reconnoitre in force with
fighting patrols. In any case, most Canadian
commanders disregarded the importance of this
type of patrol. Pope, on the other hand was
adamant and insisted that "lay-up recce patrols
[are] ... a prerequisite of any raid. "48 Pope's
argument merits serious attention because of a
successful "snatch" patrol carried out by 1 RCR
in September 1952. In Pope's words it was:
... a classic example of how to kidnap a
Chinaman. This seven-man patrol was a success
because of its preparation (a deep lay-up recce
inside enemy lines carried out by the leader of
the snatch), its originality, its stealth, and finally
its audacity. Most regrettably, this operationour only success - has not been allowed to
become a model for the Brigade. 49

Major Pope had written his commentary a year
after 1 RCRs first stint in the line and his views
continued to meet with opposition. The reason
stems from the intractability of commanders
addressed previously, but it also arose for want
of a definitive patrol doctrine within the
Commonwealth Division as a whole.
The British army manual published in
January 1952 devotes only a few lines to the
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topic of patrolling as part of battalion operations
wherein the role of patrols is to watch the enemy,
drive off enemy patrols and attempt to gain
enemy identifications. 50 Such a passive and
defensive-minded outlook suggests that
patrolling's significance amounted to little more
than front-line housekeeping. However, what
Commonwealth troops were called upon to do
required more than just keeping no-man's-land
tidy. The Canadians, armed with British
operational doctrine, were therefore
handicapped to a certain extent by the stagnation
in the development of a patrolling doctrine which
not only encouraged the carrying of the fight to
the enemy, but provided the means to accomplish
it.
To be more specific, the experiences of World
War Two had given rise to the creation of the
scout platoon within some Canadian infantry
battalions. A scout section had already existed
as part of the battalion establishment but it was
primarily a sniper section that was double-hatted
to provide limited reconnaissance capability. A
platoon formed in Sicily by the PPCLI during
1943 was an ad hoc sub-unit which had no
status in any army organization and did not exist
as a legal entity on paper, while its troops
(unwanted trouble-makers) and equipment were
scrounged from rifle companies. The platoon was
tasked to reconnoitre ahead and on the flanks
of the battalion. This included acting as guides,
mounting fighting patrols and capturing
prisoners, although it functioned, in the main,
as a reconnaissance patrol of platoon size. 5 1 By
war's end it had been disbanded with only the
sniper section remaining on the battalion order
of battle. The value of the experiment has not
been established but it remained to apply the
same logic of reconnoitring in support of an
infantry battalion's operations to that of
patrolling operations.
In Korea, the scout section of Canadian infantry
battalions was employed piecemeal, a single
scout often augmenting a patrol as its point
man. 52 The scout section does not appear to have
carried out patrols as a group and its expertise
in reconnaissance went untested. Pope's
insistence that no raid be attempted until the
enemy's position both by day and night and from
the front and the rear had been reconnoitred is
sensible. The use of scouts for this task appears
equally logical. Had Canadian commanders

Lieutenant H.R. Gardner (with Thompson
submachine gun) and Corporal Karl E. Fowler of 1
RCR were awarded the Military Cross and the
Military Medal respectively for a patrol they mounted
on 23 I 24 September 1952 that led to the capture of
a Chinese prisoner. In preparationfor their "snatch,"
the two men, along with three other soldiers, had
mounted a "lay-up" patrol near a Chinese field
kitchen, where they spent 60 long and cold hours
noting the enemy's routine.
(Photo by George Whittaker, NAC PA 151744)

chosen to employ their scouts in this manner
they would have realized that what doubled as
the battalion's snipers were too few in number.
Commanders were therefore forced to rely on
the soldiers in their rifle companies to perform
some patrol tasks for which they were poorly
trained and which would become a specialist's
forte by the end of the 1950s.
In sum, Canadian commanders were guilty
of using inappropriate patrol tactics, of generally
allowing patrols to become routine and
meaningless, and primarily, of inadequate
reconnaissance. All these failings can be linked
to the absence of an effective patrol doctrine.
Although it is less clear from an examination
of patrol reports, a general lack of training
contributed to the lacklustre performance of
Canadian patrols. There is evidence to suggest
that the problem, for the RCRs at least, began in
Canada. Like 1 PPCLI and 1 R22eR, 1 RCR had
been required to leave behind 287 parachutists
31
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as the Cold War began to make other demands
on the Canadian Army. An army telegram dated
14 February 1952 lamented that the trained
manpower situation was such that "every attempt
must be made to effect economy and not dispatch
one more than necessary to the Far East. 53
Consequently, these units remained
undermanned until, in the last months before
they deployed to Korea, the battalions were filled
out with drafts. One cannot help but wonder at
how effectively these latecomers could have been
trained before they embarked for Korea despite
Wood's assertion that the training, in the rifle
companies at least, had reached a high standard
in a short space oftime. 54 Indeed, there are many
examples in Korea that suggest that this was not
the case.
Those whom Pope referred to disparagingly
as "our one-year soldiers" were chastised for
their "deplorable lack of first aid training," their
unprofessional operation of wireless sets, and
their negligent use of firearms causing three
people to be shot due to carelessness during 1
RCRs first month on the line. 55 More training
deficiencies were uncovered by the commander
of a two-week patrol course run by the Patricias
at about the same time. He noted that the
members ofPPCLI rifle companies who attended
the training did not have "sufficient basic
knowledge of [wireless] procedure, map using
and compass work. "56 Also noted were problems
in carrying out night work, especially night firing,
and fire control. 57
The fact that a patrol course was run "in
house" suggests that the Patricias, at least,
recognized a need for better training in patrolling.
The Canadian brigade likewise saw a need for
improvement in a number of areas and therefore
ran an assortment of courses such as a Junior
Leaders Course, a Nuclear, Chemical and
Biological Warfare Course and many more
including what must have been a much sought
after Water Duties Course! 58 It is therefore
difficult to understand why the brigade did not
accord patrol training a priority at all. Not until
Brigadier Allard took over in the spring of 1953
was a brigade patrol school set up under the
auspices of its champion Major Pope, who had
opted to stay in Korea for a second tour. 59
Unfortunately the patrol school had begun
just as the Korean War neared its end and to

Pope's chagrin the training never had an
opportunity to be evaluated. 60 On a positive note,
Pope's complaint that his brigade had not
modelled its patrolling tactics on that of the
successful RCR patrol in September 1952,
proved to be inaccurate as the increase in the
number of reconnaissance patrols in 1953
demonstrates. Moreover, the patrol orders for
these missions carefully stated the aim of each
as providing information on enemy positions
with a view to later offensive action, something
which should have pleased Pope. 61
From the start, there were gaps in the
training of Canadian soldiers for Korea. Once in
theatre an interim training plan attempted to
remedy deficiencies. It was to take some time,
however, for the more pressing training needs of
infantry patrolling to be addressed, and then only
after Canada had rotated a third, relatively
unseasoned, group of infantrymen to the Far East
in 1953. But, it must be realized that in order
for training of this nature to take place patrolling
had to be recognized for what was, and still is, a
most effective means of maintaining the initiative,
particularly when conducting a withdrawal or
defensive operations.
The HQ 1 US Corps directive could have been
more effective had it not made the capture of
PWs a priority, to the detriment of patrolling's
broader function. However, the patrolling policy
may have failed in any case due to its dependence
on commanders who were not able to appreciate
the unique nature of patrolling and, therefore,
plan and prepare their operations accordingly.
Finally, successful patrolling ultimately relies on
the expertise and resourcefulness of those who
carry out the mission. Canada's soldiers, lacking
the former, were required to exercise the latter,
a characteristically Canadian substitute for
proper training which inevitably produces
indeterminate results.
In Korea a nascent Canadian patrol doctrine
was attempting to temper American enthusiasm
for offensive action with British caution. The
formula continued to be refmed and the evolution
of Canadian patrolling witnessed the
development of the reconnaissance platoon as
the newest member of the battalion support
company. In 1958 the first infantry
reconnaissance course was held. One of its
instructors was none other than Major W.H.
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Pope. 62 How much the experiences of Korea
played in this development has yet to be studied,
but certainly it must have been a combination
of Canada's experience during three very
different wars, beginning with the Great War in
1914.
After a particularly successful company raid
by his battalion in September 1951, the
Commanding Officer of 2 RCR, LieutenantColonel Keane, had boasted:
It is once again established. as in general here
in Korea, that there are no new lessons ... Our
experiences by night have led us to conclude that
the Canadian soldier with his adaptability,
initiative and native cunning is far superior to
the Chinese by night- or by day. 63

In many ways Keane was right. Canadian
soldiers in Korea did not have to learn any new
lessons, but merely had to rediscover humility
whilst relearning some old drills.
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